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ABSTRACT
Corporate insolvency law aims to provide instruments of corporate survival or rescue. The 
revival of companies on the brink of economic collapse may involve rescue procedures 
that go beyond the normal managerial responses to corporations in distress and they may 
operate through both informal mechanisms and formal legal procedures. Most importantly 
only viable companies and businesses deserve to be rescued. There are various types of 
rescue actions to turnaround corporate fortunes at a time of corporate crisis. This could be 
in the form of a broad range of restructuring activities. This article examines the informal 
rescue practices and mechanisms available to troubled companies in the UK and Malaysia. 
Some common rescue mechanisms that are discussed include sell-offs, management buy-
out (MBO), debt for equity conversion, retrenchment, redundancy as well as ‘workout’ 
arrangements to restructure debts owed by companies to banks or creditors.
Keywords: Corporate rehabilitation, informal rescue mechanisms, restructuring, turnaround, workout
INTRODUCTION
Corporate rescue has been defined as “a 
major intervention necessary to avert 
eventual failure of the company,” (Belcher, 
1999) and “the revival of companies on 
the brink of economic collapse and the 
salvage of economically viable units to 
restore production capacity, employment 
and the continued rewarding of capital 
and investment” (Omar, 1997). Rescue 
procedures involve going beyond the 
normal managerial responses to corporate 
troubles and they may operate through 
informal mechanisms as well as formal 
Ruzita Azmi and Adilah Abd Razak
162 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 22 (S): 161 - 182 (2014)
legal processes (Finch, 2009). Central 
to the notion of rescue is the idea that 
drastic remedial action is taken at a time 
of corporate crisis (Belcher, 1997; Finch, 
2009). Basically, all these views support the 
notion that rescues should not be confined to 
formal rescue procedures but be widened to 
cover informal rescue mechanisms.
As noted, troubled companies may 
resort to formal rescue mechanisms. 
Indeed, there are two types of corporate 
formal rescue procedures practised in 
both Malaysia and the UK to resolve a 
corporate debtor’s financial problems 
namely Scheme of Arrangement (SOA) and 
Administrative Receivership (AR), while 
Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) 
and Administration are available only in the 
UK. Alongside those procedures corporate 
debtors can be rescued informally. However, 
when all informal rescue strategies have 
been exhausted, the ailing company  should 
enter into the formal rescue process as a last 
resort (Finch, 2002). 
It has been pointed out that formal 
proceedings can be pricey and lengthy, and 
can destabilise public faith in the company 
and lay an enormous administrative burden 
on the debtor (Neyens, 2002). Therefore, 
companies, when faced with financial 
problems, may choose to renegotiate their 
debt directly with their creditors, without 
recourse to the formal process (Franks 
and Sussman, 2000). Frank & Sussman 
(2000) discovered that there are elaborate 
rescue processes outside formal procedures. 
They claimed that about 75% of firms 
emerge from rescue and avoid formal 
insolvency procedures altogether (after 
7.5 months, on average). These firms are 
either turned around or repay their debt 
by finding alternative banking sources. 
The remaining 25% of cases enter some 
form of insolvency procedure, usually 
administrative receivership, or winding 
up. It is claimed that most rescues are 
achieved through informal action (Finch, 
2009). According to Finch (2009) “informal 
actions do not demand any resort to statutory 
insolvency procedures but are contractually 
based and such actions are usually instituted 
by directors or creditors and may involve 
a turnaround professional or ‘company 
doctor’ to investigate the company’s affairs 
and to make recommendations.”
It should be noted that international 
bodies such as United Nations Commissions 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 
the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) have agreed that, besides formal 
rescue or insolvency procedures to resolve 
corporate debtors’ financial difficulties, 
there should be informal mechanisms that 
allow debtors and creditors to resolve 
their differences in a consensual manner 
outside the formal procedure (UNCITRAL, 
2001; World Bank, 2005; IMF, 1999). 
In addition, the International Insolvency 
Institute emphasized that the informal 
process is significant because formal rescue 
regimes are not always entirely suitable to 
the task of rescuing firms with financial 
problems (International Insolvency Institute, 
Law & Policy, 2000). Informal attempts 
at rescuing the company or its business 
may precede a formal rescue, and may be 
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done when the fortunes of the corporation 
could be informally turned around or the 
ailing company can informally work out 
the debts owed to their banks or creditors 
through negotiation or arrangement, without 
the company entering a formal rescue 
procedure.
Considering the importance of informal 
rescue to financially sick firms, this article 
examines informal rescue mechanisms in 
the UK and Malaysia. In order to analyse 
informal rescue actions and activities, 
the author collected information through 
primary and secondary data. Sources of 
data are judicial decisions, textbooks and 
articles from journals and law reviews. This 
paper examines the concept of informal 
turnaround and workout. It also explores 
some informal common mechanisms as 
possible components of corporate rescue.
These include methods to turnaround the 
company or its business; to workout with 
creditors or banks the debts owed by the 
company to them; and also to negotiate 
the raising of extra finance or investment 
in order to rescue the ailing company or its 
business.
CONCEPT OF INFORMAL 
‘TURNAROUND’ AND ‘WORKOUT’
Informal turnaround is a “very general 
concept and encompasses various types of 
rescue activities,” (Belcher, 1997) and “such 
informal turnarounds are often achieved 
with the support of the company’s bankers 
and/or of a company doctor” (Walters 
and Armour, 2006). Meanwhile, informal 
workouts/arrangements may also cover 
possible financing arrangements designed 
to obtain extra finance in order to stay in 
business or for the company’s survival. 
It should be noted that International 
bodies like UNCITRAL, the World Bank 
and the IMF, having discussed the policy 
choices to be addressed by countries when 
designing an insolvency system, had 
focused on arrangement or negotiation as an 
alternative mechanism to formal procedures, 
yet gave little consideration to the notion 
of informal turnaround (UNCITRAL, 
2005). Meanwhile, some commentators 
have defined a turnaround candidate as “a 
company or business entity faced with a 
period of crisis sufficiently serious to require 
a radical improvement in order to remain a 
significant participant in its major industry” 
(Zimmerman, 1991; Belcher, 1997).
Belcher (1997) and Zimmerman 
(1991) view turnaround as a process which 
involvesreversal; meaning dramatic and 
sustained improvements in the company’s 
performance at the point of corporate 
crisis. They also maintain that companies 
normally revert to turnaround when 
their very existence is threatened. Other 
commentators like Goldston (1992) 
recognise that turnarounds can be classified 
as a marketing turnaround, financial 
turnaround or operations turnaround.This 
means specific types of turnaround may be 
required for a company depending on the 
evaluation of the company’s crisis. 
A workout is described as financial 
rescue of a company in distress, which 
takes place outside the limits of insolvency 
law (Kent, 1997). According to Belcher a 
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workout is “the restructuring of the terms of a 
company’s debt contracts to remedy or avoid 
default achieved by private negotiations 
with its creditor outside formal bankruptcy 
or insolvency proceedings” (Belcher, 1997). 
It is fair to say that a workout includes 
arrangements or negotiations between the 
corporate debtor and its creditor/bankers 
outside the formal rescue process to obtain 
financial investments or rescheduling or 
restructuring of debts. A workout is normally 
arranged by the company’s leading banks, 
but it may also involve major shareholders, 
bondholders, clients and suppliers, who have 
a direct interest in the continued existence 
of the company (Kent, 1997). 
It seems that the concept of ‘turnaround’ 
and ‘workout’ involves ‘restructuring’ of the 
company’s operations, structure, business, 
workforce or terms of company’s debt as the 
company responds to the corporate crisis. 
Also, some measures of rescue attempt or 
activity are presented to turnaround the 
company or its business when a workout 
takes place between the corporate debtor 
and its creditors or bankers. The following 
discussion examines the various types of 
rescue activities to turnaround the company 
or its business and to workout solutions with 
the company’s bankers and creditors in order 
for the company or its business to survive. 
COMMON INFORMAL RESCUE 
MECHANISMS IN THE UK AND 
MALAYSIA.
As noted, directors, creditors or shareholders 
are able to take informal and formal actions 
in order to effect rescues for companies that 
are financially distressed (Finch, 2009). 
It is important to note that various drastic 
remedial actions may have to be taken 
at a time of corporate crisis. Rescuing 
troubled companies may inevitably require 
the companies to be restructured. Such 
restructuring involves parts of the business 
being sold off to other companies or to 
managers in MBO. The companies may 
also undergo corporate reorganization or 
restructuring whereby the workforce is 
reduced through retrenchment; redundancy 
or Voluntary Redundancy (VR) or Voluntary 
Separation Scheme (VSS). The quest to 
turnaround the company in distress may 
include refinancing the corporate debts as 
well as capital reorganization via debt equity 
swap and to workout with creditors or banks 
the debts owed by the company to them. In 
the following sections some informal rescue 
actions and activities are presented.
Restructuring
It  has been pointed out by Belcher 
(1997) that restructuring is one of the 
ways used by a company to respond to 
crisis. Restructuring comes in many forms 
including sell off, where elements of the 
business are closed or part of the business 
is sold to another company or even to 
managers in a MBO. Restructuring also 
involves downsizing where the workforce 
is reduced by means of retrenchment and 
redundancy, VR or VSS. The company in 
distress may engage in capital reorganisation 
by means of a debt-equity swap. It may also 
need to restructure its debts or financing 
arrangements andengage in a workout.
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Sell-offs and MBO 
Selling off parts of the business or closing 
down parts of the business are the most 
encountered form of restructuring. When a 
firm is experiencing financial crisis, closing 
down a part of the business that is a financial 
drain can save the rest, and a sell off can have 
positive effect if it raises much needed cash 
immediately (Belcher, 1997). Normally, in 
a sell-off situation, the company must first 
decide what type of core business it wants 
to participate in, and then decisions must 
be made on which part of the business 
to sell. Here, the core business must be a 
viable one and the business or assets to sell 
must be attractive enough to get interested 
buyers. After selling off the unwanted assets 
or business, the company resources can be 
pooled together to concentrate on the core 
business in order to improve productivity 
and competitiveness. In return for selling 
off the non-core business, the company 
can generate revenue, which can be used 
to pay off debts and reduce the company’s 
borrowings. With only the core business to 
concentrate on, company overheads can be 
reduced to a minimum, and the company can 
be nurtured back to profitability. As for the 
non-core business that was sold off, there 
is a chance that the new owner would be 
able to rescue it (Belcher, 1997). Therefore, 
selling portions of the company, such as a 
division that is no longer rewarding or which 
has distracted management from its core 
business, can greatly improve the company’s 
balance sheet.
Sell-offs can also be achieved in the 
form of hive down, leveraged buy-out and 
MBO. In a hive down, the relevant assets 
are transferred to a newly set up subsidiary 
company by management for sell-offs. In 
a leveraged buy-out, the purchase of the 
business is heavily financed by bank loans 
(Belcher, 1997). MBO is a special form of 
sell-off and is defined as a sell-off where 
the existing management is the purchaser, 
and this is heavily funded by the bank to 
enable the purchaser to acquire an existing 
product line or business (Storey, 1996). 
According to Belcher (1997) the first stage 
in a MBO is for the management team to 
ask the consultant or a financial institution 
to act as intermediary and carry out an 
initial appraisal of the proposed deal. If the 
consultant gives a positive report on the 
initial appraisal, then informal discussions 
with the management of the parent company 
will be initiated (Belcher, 1997). Normally, 
this will take place before the company 
is involved in formal rescue. In the UK, 
if the company is under receivership or 
administration, a proposal could still be 
made and this would require less need of 
secrecy and consultation with intermediaries 
before the initial approach, as management 
at this stage would have little to lose. In 
a case where the initial approach is well 
received, details of the negotiations will 
follow. Within a formal rescue regime, 
the sell-off of part or the entire company 
becomes public knowledge. However, the 
negotiation process can be held secret from 
the public if it occurs outside a legal/formal 
rescue regime. The management team will 
need the strong backing of the bank to 
complete the purchase, and usually this will 
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work as a filter to discourage incompetent 
managers becoming purchasers (Belcher, 
1997).
MBOs are usually heavily financed 
by the bank, which normally comes up 
with ninety percent of the financing with 
the remaining ten percent being put up 
by the purchaser. This means that the 
newly acquired company is quite often 
left with a high monthly repayment both 
for the principal amount and the interest 
in order to service the loan. Despite this, 
the performance of MBOs is usually very 
good, with a success rate of more than 
eighty percent (Belcher, 1997). In an MBO, 
the success formula is the quality and 
the innovation of the management team. 
In numerous circumstances of distress, 
management is a liability rather than an 
asset to the company. It is important to note 
that researchcomparing results of various 
studies like Slater (1984) and Belcher (1997) 
have found  lack of financial or accounting 
control, poor or inadequate management 
as well as management or marketing 
problems to be a major contribution to the 
cause of corporate decline. According to 
Slater (1984) and Belcher (1997) in many 
instances, the solution to the problem of 
company distress is to change the current 
management so that the company can be 
turned into a corporate success.
Interestingly, the implications of MBO 
could be linked to the ‘phoenix syndrome’ (a 
shorthand expression), which was identified 
by the Review Committee on Insolvency 
and Practice also known as the Cork 
Report (1982). The Cork Report referred 
to the ‘phoenix syndrome’ scenario where 
the director of an insolvent company sets 
up business again and trades with assets 
purchased at a discount from the liquidator 
of the old company, leaving behind a trail 
of unpaid creditors (Cork Report, 1982: 
Para 1813). Although the report’s primary 
concern was to deal with the director of 
an insolvent company who starts a fresh 
company to take over the business of the 
failed company, it was of the opinion that 
it is necessary to deal with the director who 
transfers the trading activities to a new 
company shortly before in anticipation of 
the failure of the old (Cork Report, 1982: 
Para 1830). It should be noted that in the 
UK part of the regulation of the ‘phoenix 
syndrome’ is contained in ss. 216 and 217 
of the Insolvency Act 1986.
In Malaysia, rescue may be attempted 
by selling off or closing down the parts of 
the business that are caught in financial 
problems. Restructuring in the form of 
sell off is also employed to show profit or 
to curtail deterioration of the company’s 
profit. It was reported that BP plc, Europe’s 
largest oil company, was selling off its petrol 
stations in 270 outlets in Malaysia for up 
to RM1 billion, and the decision had been 
made by BP on the grounds that returns 
from Malaysia were not good enough (Chia 
and Shiew, 2004). Similar to the UK, a 
MBO takes place when the management 
of a company buys over the company from 
the existing shareholders and is normally 
supported by the banking sector for greater 
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success (Yahya, 1995). 
However, MBOs seem to have been 
a ‘mixed bag of results.’ Companies like 
Malaysian Resources Corporation Ltd. 
(MRCB) and its listed subsidiaries have 
undergone a MBO in an effort to show 
profit. Meanwhile companies with managers 
as owners have also been seen to have 
better chances for long-term survival (The 
Edge Daily Business, 2005). It is critical 
for MBOs to get the support of the banks 
and the relevant authorities to make it 
successful. There are two reasons why a 
MBO may occur, depending on whether the 
companies are profitable (The Edge Daily 
Business, 2005). Firstly, in addition to the 
more common reasons, a MBO rewards 
managers who have played important 
roles in running the business.Secondly, an 
MBO exercise is to allow the managers to 
freely run and hopefully turn around the 
business of a company that is not doing 
well. Notwithstanding that the company 
was run by the managers, generally the 
performance of these companies tends to 
decline or show inconsistent results after 
a MBO exercise has taken place, as the 
managers who may be experts at running 
the company, may not have much experience 
in making acquisitions. Furthermore, such 
MBO usually occurwithin a short time frame 
and need extensive and multiple sources 
of capital as well as legal, accounting and 
other professional support.This could end up 
being detrimental to the company over the 
long term (The Edge Daily Business, 2005).
Retrenchment, redundancy, VSS and 
“Last in, first out” (LIFO) principles
Retrenchment and redundancy are some 
of the forms of corporate restructuring. 
“Retrenchment” may happen not only during 
recession but could also be relevant when 
the economic situation is good” (Marsono 
and Jusoff, 2008). Retrenchment refers to 
activities that reduce the scope or scale of 
an organization’s operations. It has also been 
referred to as downsizing, resizing, cutbacks 
and rationalization.If these were necessary 
for the survival of a company, then it would 
constitute a rescue (Belcher, 1997).As 
described by Belcher (1997), the economic 
arguments for closure of a particular plant 
or site of operation may be strong and 
retrenchment may appear to be a relatively 
easy solution, yet retrenchment may have 
political costs which should be taken into 
account. Although retrenchment is needed to 
help rescue a company or its business, it may 
not be a popular choice with the workers, 
managers and the public mainly due to 
their resistance to change and for economic 
reasons. A successful retrenchment requires 
careful management to accommodate the 
political as well as economic problems and 
pressure .A high level of morale, motivation, 
and commitment within the company is 
also necessary to help make retrenchment a 
successful turnaround (Belcher, 1997).
In the UK, one example is the case of 
Ford motor company, which announced on 
17 September 2004 that it was closing down 
the Brown’s Lane factory in Coventry and 
retrenching about one thousand and one 
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hundred workers. For Ford the justification 
of the closing down of this plant and the 
retrenchment was to cut down on Jaguar 
losses and to cut costs so that the company 
could be nurtured back to profitability by 
being more competitive (Pagnamenta, 
2004). For the analyst, Jaguar losses could 
be due to mismanagement, stiff competition, 
and the weak dollar, which dampened sales 
in the US market. Jaguar produced 120,000 
cars yearly, short of the 300,000 needed 
to achieve an economy of scales. The 
production plant closure and retrenchment 
was supposed to save the company eighty 
millions pounds yearly. However, this 
generated a lot of ill feeling amongst the 
workers toward the parent company, Ford 
of the US, which promised to keep all three 
UK production plants afloat since buying 
it in 1990. The workers in the meantime 
promised to take whatever action was 
necessary in order to keep their jobs and this 
included protests and pickets (Pagnamenta, 
2004). In 2007 it was reported that the 
Jaguar workers’ union had given its backing 
to the Tata Motors’ bid to buy Jaguar from 
the US giant Ford because union members 
believed its industrial background would 
be a good fit.Moreover, Tata Motors also 
promised that it wouldcontinue to keep open 
all three UK factories which jointly employ 
more than 13,000workers (Cunliffe, 2007).
According to Honeyball (2006), one of 
the reasons why redundancy may happen 
is because a workplace is closing down or 
fewer employees are needed for a particular 
kind of work. In the UK, there are statutory 
controls on redundancy under the ambit 
of the Employment Rights Act 1996.This 
provides that an eligible employee may 
claim a redundancy payment and such 
payment is designed to tide an employee 
over the period of uncertainty and hardship 
after redundancy (Honeyball, 2006). 
It is pointed out that in Malaysia, 
redundancy and retrenchment are some 
of the forms of corporate reorganization 
and it has been referred to as “alteration in 
the structure of the company or business 
…for the primary purpose of sustaining 
the continuity of the company or the 
business itself on a going-concern basis” 
(Segaran, 2000). Redundancy as pointed 
out by Segaran (2000) occurs where the 
company concerned is faced with redundant 
employees due to either a surplus of labour 
or the reduction of workload for specific 
positions after the reorganization, and 
under such circumstances, the retention of 
the services of the redundant employees 
would not be economically sound for the 
company if it were to continue to exist as a 
profitable ongoingconcern. It is likely in this 
situation that redundancy will be considered 
as one of the rescue mechanisms where 
companies will try to cut costs by reducing 
their workforce in order to stay in business 
or for the survival of the company. 
According to Marsono and Jusoff 
(2008) redundancy can occur for a number 
of reasons such as a downturn in production, 
sales or economy; the introduction of 
technology; business relocation; a business 
merger or a business is sold; or restructuring 
of a company. It is claimed that the law 
permits termination of service for operational 
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reasons under the umbrella of redundancy 
(Marsono and Jusoff, 2008).
In the case of Bal Plantations Sdn Bhd 
v. Sabah Plantation Industry Employees’ 
Union (1984) the court held that the term 
‘retrenchment’ connotes, by its ordinary 
acceptance, that the business itself is being 
continued but that a portion of the labour 
force is discharged as surplus.In another 
case Georgetown Pharmacy (M) Sdn Bhd 
v. National Union of Commercial Workers 
(1992) the Industrial Court confined the 
usage of the term ‘retrenchment’ to mean 
a discharge of surplus labour. Accordingly, 
retrenchment means the termination of a 
contract of service for reasons of redundancy.
Interestingly, it is well established 
in Malaysia’s Industrial Law that if an 
employer is a company, it has the right to 
restructure its business in such a manner, 
as it believes fit for economic efficiency.
In this respect, the company may downsize 
its workforce by means of redundancy 
and retrenchment (Segaran, 2000). This 
principle was upheld in Maser Sdn Bhd v. 
Yeoh Oon Wah (1990) where it was decided 
that it is for the management to decide the 
strength of its staff which it thinks necessary 
for efficiency in its undertaking and the court 
cannot dictate to the employer the number 
of persons to be employed in order to run its 
business profitably. Furthermore, it was held 
in Maser’s case (1990) that the employer has 
the right to restructure the enterprise and to 
terminate the service of employees who are 
redundant. An employer who carries out a 
retrenchment exercise must be motivated by 
sound reasons and conviction that such an 
exercise is indeed desirable and that it will 
enable the employer to run the businessmore 
efficiently in the long term. 
In a case of Plusnet Communication Sdn 
Bhd & Ors v Leong Lai Peng (2005) the 
court wasof the opinion that a redundancy 
situation did exist as a result of reorganization 
and downsizing carried out by the company 
to minimize losses. It has been pointed out 
by Marsono and Jusoff (2008 )that the court 
will look at several matters when the issue of 
retrenchment is referred to them. Amongst 
others these include  whether retrenchment 
was justified; whether the employer is in 
a position to give the true grounds for the 
retrenchment and whether the retrenchment 
is made bonafide. The court in TWI Training 
and Certification (SE Asia) Sdn Bhd v Jose 
Sebastian (1998) has ruled that as long as the 
measures taken by the employerare genuine 
commercial and economic considerations, 
it has the managerial prerogative to decide 
in the best interest of its management to 
identify its own area of weakness and then 
proceed to discharge its own surplus. It has 
been emphasized that retrenchment must be 
a bona fide exercise and the employer should 
not abuse such prerogative (Segaran, 2000). 
It has been decided in Kumpulan Perubatan 
(Johor) Sdn Bhd v Mohd Razi Haron (2000), 
that massive retrenchment made by the 
employer was a genuine measure and not 
done for any ulterior motive to victimize the 
employees. The Industrial Court also found 
no evidence that the employer had acted 
with mala fide in the retrenchment process. 
In Gurbux Singh Prabha Singh v. J 
White & Co (M) Sdn Bhd(1981)it was held 
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that the employer should, when selecting 
employees to be retrenched, not only act 
reasonably, but also observe any customary 
arrangement or code of conduct. The code of 
conduct referred to in this case is the Code of 
Conduct for Industrial Harmony 1975 (Code 
1975). This code was endorsed in February 
1975 by the Malayan Council for Employer 
Organisations (representing employers) 
and the Malaysian Trades Union Congress 
(representing employees) and was witnessed 
by the Minister of Human Resources. The 
purpose of the Code is to promote sound 
industrial relations practice in Malaysia 
and to lay down principles and guidelines 
to employers and employees on the practice 
of industrial relations for achieving greater 
industrial harmony (Segaran, 2000).Section 
30(5A) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 
provides :
“In making an award, the Court 
may take into consideration any 
agreement or code relating to 
employment practices between 
organizations representative 
of  employers  and  workmen 
respectively where such agreement 
or code has been approved by the 
Minister.”
I n  K e s a t u a n  P e k e r j a - P e k e r j a 
Perusahaan Logam v. KL George Kent 
(M) Bhd (1991), the Malaysian High 
Court upheld that the Industrial Court is 
bound to consider the provisions of the 
Code of Conduct for Industrial Harmony 
while deciding on disputes relating to 
retrenchment. In this case, there was a 
provision in a collective agreement between 
the employer and employees that they agreed 
to observe the provisions of the Code. One 
of the provisions in the Code provides that 
the retrenched employees should be given 
priority for engagement or re-engagement. 
However, the Industrial Court in its decision 
did not consider this provision. On appeal 
the High Court reversed the Industrial 
Court’s decision and held that the latter has 
made a jurisdictional error when it failed to 
consider the relevant clause in the collective 
agreement. The employer was bound to 
follow the provision of the Code, which 
provided that the retrenched employees 
should be given priority of engagement or 
re-engagement rather than bringing in new 
employees.
It is important to note that the Industrial 
Court recognized the principles of Code 1975 
and thishas generally been accepted as good 
industrial relations practice in undertaking 
a retrenchment exercise (Segaran, 2000).
In Rocon Equipment Sdn Bhd & Anor v 
Zainuddin Muhammad Salleh (2005), the 
Industrial Court stressed that although 
there is ample justification for redundancy, 
the retrenchment is to be done in line with 
the accepted standards of retrenchment’s 
procedure. Code 1975 suggests that one of 
the appropriate measures to be taken by an 
employer under retrenchment is to introduce 
VSS before imposing the redundancy and 
preferably for such Scheme to be combined 
with reasonable monetary benefits (Clause 
22 (a) Code of Conduct 1975). It should 
also be noted that in the Malaysian context, 
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companies could employ VSS as one of 
the avenues to reduce costs in the long run. 
Employers are told to give as early a warning 
as practicable and consult the employees and 
their union representatives. The employer 
must also spread the retrenchment over 
a longer period and also retire workers 
who are beyond their normal retiring age 
(Clause 22(a) Code of Conduct, 1975). 
Furthermore, with effect from 1998, all 
employers are required by virtue of s. 63 
A of the Employment Act 1955 to submit a 
report on retrenchment to the nearest Labour 
Department of the impending retrenchment 
exercise at least one month before each 
retrenchment is carried out. 
The principle of “Last in, first out” 
(LIFO) or “first come, last go” or “last come, 
first go” is recognized and applied by the 
Malaysian Courts(Ahmad Mir and Ahmad 
Kamar, 2003). LIFO means the junior 
employee would have to leaveemployment 
before the senior could be directed to leave 
(Ramasamy, 2002). According to Marsono 
and Jusoff (2008) such an arrangement has 
advantages to employees as it reduces the 
possibility that the management maymake 
selections in terminating employees on 
the basis of favouritism. In the case of 
Aluminium Company of Malaysia Bhd v 
Jaspal Singh (1978), the employee was 
retrenched by the company on the grounds 
of redundancy, which was challenged on the 
ground that there was no such redundancy. 
In this case the Industrial Court ruled that 
the principles of LIFO have to be followed 
by the employer in the case of retrenchment. 
The Court found that the claimant’s job 
was still in existence after his retrenchment 
and the employer had failed to consider 
that the claimant was the first who joined 
the company for the post compared to the 
other superintendents. As a result, the court 
held that the retrenchment was wrongly 
exercised. The Court also said that the 
question of comparative seniority of an 
employee for applying the principle of LIFO 
has to be determined with reference to the 
employee working in the same category. 
It is important to note that the principle of 
LIFO is only applied where other things 
are equal (Ahmad Mir and Ahmad Kamal, 
2012).Ahmad Mir and Ahmad Kamal 
(2003) have pointed out that the principle 
of LIFO restricts employer’s common law 
right to decide which of the employees 
should be retrenched. Indeed, the employer 
can bona fide retain employees possessing 
special qualification in the interest of the 
business without following the principle 
of LIFOHowever, the reason for departing 
from the rule must be stated in the order of 
termination (Ahmad Mir and Ahmad Kamal, 
2003).
Marsono and Jusoff (2008) argued 
that the principle of LIFO is flexible and 
the Code is merely a moral guideline 
between the employer and employees and 
no penalty can be imposed against the 
employers for their failure to follow its 
provisions. Nevertheless, in the case of 
Mamut Copper Mining Bhd v Chau Fook 
Kong & Others (1997) and in Weeluk 
Cooperation (Sarawak) Sdn Bhd v Wee 
Siak Luan (1998) the courts emphasized 
in Mamut’s case that the employers are 
Ruzita Azmi and Adilah Abd Razak
172 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 22 (S): 161 - 182 (2014)
expected not only to follow the LIFO 
principle but also other principles provided 
for by the Code. However, in the latter 
case the court held that a retrenchment is 
only justified if it is made in line with the 
accepted industrial relations standards, 
practices and procedures.
Accordingly, for the survival of the 
company or its business, a company has 
the right to downsize its workforce via 
redundancy or retrenchment, yet it must 
comply with the Code and LIFO before 
opting for a retrenchment exercise. It 
is fair to say that it has always been the 
company’s prerogative to reorganize its 
business for the sake of the company or 
business survival. The courts will always 
respect the company’s decision as they are 
not ‘men of business’. Indeed the courts 
acknowledged the importance of making 
commercial decisions on the part of the 
company as an employer. Furthermore, the 
company as an employerhas the prerogative 
power especially in matters relating to an 
improvement of its business (Marsono 
and Jusoff, 2008). However in doing so, 
the company must follow the law. Despite 
the prerogative power to organize and 
arrange its businesses including determining 
whether or not to retrench the employees, 
the company’s purpose of carrying out a 
retrenchment exercise must be for genuine 
reasons as well as be free from mala fide or 
unfair labour practices.If there is no ample 
justification for redundancy, it shall be 
deemed that the termination was without 
just cause or excuse as decided by Federal 
Court in the case of Goon Kwee Phoy v J 
& P Coats (M) Bhd (1981). Accordingly, in 
case of a breach of an employment contract 
or unfair dismissal by a company or an 
employer, legal action could be brought 
against them.
Debt for Equity Conversion/Swap
Another form of rescue activity available to 
ailing companies in the UK and Malaysia 
that may informally turn the company affairs 
around is debt-equity conversions. This can 
be defined as ‘capital reorganizations in 
which creditors (usually, but not exclusively, 
lenders) exchange or convert a proportion of 
a company’s indebtedness for one or more 
classes of its share capital’ (Chatterji and 
Hedges, 2001: p.246). It is claimed that debt-
equity transactions can provide an effective 
and efficient means of allowing troubled 
companies to continue operations and of 
avoiding formal insolvency procedures 
(Finch, 2009). Such transactions might 
be attractive for the creditors as well as 
companies. For companies these transactions 
may reduce their financial risk by improving 
their balance sheet structure whilst relieving 
cash flow and working capital difficulties.
When a company plans for equity swap 
transaction, it is usually in a state where it 
is unable to meet its debt servicing burden 
and its business operations are seriously 
constrained, either by lack of operating or 
investment cash. Therefore, by substantially 
reducing its debt-servicing obligation a 
swap transaction provides a robust financial 
foundation for its turnaround (Chatterji and 
Hedges, 2001).
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Debt-Equity conversion can also bring 
back strategic shareholders confidence in 
the company since debt swap transaction 
increases the company’s financial strength 
(Finch, 2009). Through the transaction, the 
financial profile and gearing of the company 
will improve as debts and competitive 
disadvantages are eliminated. Consequently, 
the company has a brighter opportunity 
to get new credit line from creditors, to 
attract new business as well as to restore the 
confidence of its current customers. From 
the creditor’s point of view, a debt/equity 
conversion is attractive because it would 
give them a chance to earn a higher return on 
their investment than the return available on 
liquidation (Finch, 2009).This is especially 
true in a situation where banks have given 
loans without collateral to larger quoted 
groups that have borrowed from many 
banks. The rate of recovery is very low in 
an insolvency process and as such debt/
equity conversion can be more desirable 
than resorting to a formal insolvency 
procedure (Finch, 2009). In a prestigious 
project, a debt to equity conversion is a good 
public relations exercise for the creditors’ 
companies because the public will see the 
creditors as being dedicated to the industry 
and devoted to its customers during their 
financial dilemma (Finch, 2009). In 1996 
in the UK, the Department of Trade and 
Industry stressed the important contribution 
that debt/equity swap can make in allowing 
troubled companies to reorganise their 
affairs (DTI, 1996; Finch, 2009).
Apart from all the advantages mentioned, 
debt to equity conversion also faces a few 
difficulties and drawbacks. Finch (2009) 
emphasises that in debt to equity conversion 
schemes, creditors will lose their priority 
(unless they are secured or preferential 
creditors) if the company was to liquidate 
due to their new status as shareholders, and 
they will only receive their payment after 
all the creditors have been paid. Another 
drawback of this scheme is that they tend 
to be considerably more complicated 
than conventional debt refinancing and 
rescheduling and involve many parties 
with conflicting interests and complex legal 
and regulatory issues which make it time 
consuming and expensive to complete a 
successful scheme (Chatterji and Hedges, 
2001).In addition, extra shareholders bring 
considerable on-going legal and regulatory 
commitment, and banks do not normally 
have the administrative infrastructure to 
deal with shareholdings even though some 
of the commitment can be assigned to a 
lead or agent bank (Chatterji and Hedges, 
2001). The Banks’ situation as lender and 
shareholder can result in possible conflicts 
of interest, as there can be pressure to 
continue giving money to a company in 
which an institution is a shareholder, even 
though such lending does not meet the 
minimum credit requirement (Chatterji and 
Hedges, 2001).
Rescheduling and Extra Finance or Fund 
Companies in distress can negotiate to 
restructure the terms of a company’s debt 
and such agreement may operate informally 
and contractually (as well as within a formal 
process by means of SOA practised in 
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both UK and Malaysia; or CVA between 
the corporate debtor and its creditors or 
bankerswhich is practiced only in the UK). 
Rescheduling is “a contractual arrangement 
entered into by a debtor company or 
companies with all or some of their banks 
or creditors” (Lickorish, 1990: 53). Debt 
rescheduling permits the company to stay 
alive for the time being by reducing its debt 
servicing obligations in terms of reduced 
capital repayments and /or interest charges, 
besides which there is no direct injection of 
finance (Belcher, 1997).
Rescheduling the company’s debt may 
ease immediate problems faced by a troubled 
company, in particular where the company’s 
credit is supplied by a small number of 
banks and the company’s financial problems 
are short term in nature (Finch, 2009). 
Finch (2002) argued that rescheduling may 
catch the attention of the banks since such 
informality evades the adverse publicity 
involved in precipitating the liquidation of 
a company. According to her, rescheduling 
allows securities to be adjusted and may be 
appropriate where a few banks are involved, 
and the company’s financial problems can 
be overcome by changing the progressive 
interest or principal repayment (Finch, 
2002). In addition, where creditors in a 
diversity of jurisdictions are involved with 
a company, it may be faster and cheaper 
to react to problems by negotiating new 
contracts rather than by resorting to formal 
proceedings (Finch, 2002). One of the main 
problems of rescheduling is that when many 
banks are involved and some banks feel 
uncommitted to the company involved, 
there is a lack of close relationship with the 
company, and thus an absence of loyalty to 
the company (Finch, 2002).
When companies are faced with 
financial crisis, they can resort to their banks 
or other banks to provide additional finance 
if their individual managements are capable, 
and have a core business that is viable with 
good planning. These factors may give 
confidence to the banks to lend the company 
extra finance. It is fair to say that by offering 
extra finance at times of crisis the banks 
can and do rescue small companies. This is 
also referred to as ‘bank rescues’ (Belcher, 
1997). Perhaps such ‘bank rescues’ are more 
straightforward in a case where the banks 
are already the lenders to the company and 
should know the company better to make a 
good evaluation of the company’s survival 
before getting involved with arrangements 
for any additional finance to the company. 
With faster reimbursement of the additional 
finance a company can react at an early stage 
to help solve its financial difficulty. For most 
companies such a problem may only be 
short term in nature, thus, quick additional 
financial help from the banks is enough. 
Apart from bank rescue another alternative 
available to a company facing financial 
crisis is to initiate formal rescue procedures. 
However, the bank, as a secured lender also 
has an option to initiate action for repayment 
of the facility or to put the company under 
liquidation process or appoint a receiver or 
an administrator (only applies in the UK).In 
this situation, the company is at the mercy 
of the banks.
In Malaysia, workouts or financing 
arrangements cover extra finance from 
banks and rescheduling which is similar to 
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practice in the UK.. Practically companies 
which are facing financial distress in 
Malaysia can negotiate with their bankers/
creditors to reschedule their borrowing. 
Normally, if they have a viable proposal the 
banks/creditors would agree to reschedule 
their borrowing. This can be done by 
reducing their monthly repayments and thus 
prolonging the repayment period. Indeed, 
the central bank of Malaysia, Bank Negara, 
encourages banks to work closely with their 
clients (Central Bank of Malaysia, 1999). It 
is possible for companies facing financial 
difficulties to request that their bank give 
extra finance or funds to help them alleviate 
the problem (Central Bank of Malaysia, 
1999). Again, the banks would normally 
look at the viability of the business in 
which the companies are engaged, and if the 
businesses were viable, this would improve 
the chances of the companies getting 
additional finance from the respective bank 
(Central Bank of Malaysia, 1999).
Informal workout: London Approach 
(LA) and Corporate Debt Restructuring 
Committee (CDRC)
The concept of informal workouts in the 
UK includes the ‘London Approach’ (LA) 
of which the Bank of England (BOE) is the 
patron. This approach has been copied and 
developed in some other countries including 
Malaysia; yet such an approach needs to 
be tailored to fit local circumstances. In 
Malaysia the establishment of the CDRC 
in 1998 with guidance and headship from 
the CBOM was inspired by the BOE 
supervision in the corporate workout 
(Azmi and Abd Razak, 2011).The lack of 
an orderly arbitration to workout debtor-
creditor problems without resorting to legal 
proceedings in rescuing financially troubled 
companies in both jurisdictions, was the 
main reason why the central banks in both 
countries published a set of non-binding 
guidelines via the LA and the CDRC. 
Accordingly, both the LA and CDRC 
provide incentives for corporate borrowers 
and their creditors/banks to negotiate a 
corporate workout outside the confines of 
the formal rescue process. The LA under 
the patronage of the BOE came into force in 
the UK thirty five years prior to the creation 
of the CDRC in Malaysia and indeed was 
the inspiring scheme behind the creation of 
the latter.
As noted, the CDRC’s framework was 
a reproduction of the LA that has been 
tailored to fit into the specific conditions in 
Malaysia with some modification. The key 
features and framework of both mechanisms 
are similar.For instance, banks/creditors 
are supportive and sharing of information 
among the participants in the workout and 
lossesis carried out in a fair manner (Kent, 
1996; Rajandram, 1999). Indeed, their 
frameworks are comparable including a 
‘standstill’/moratorium’ period among the 
creditors towards the debtors company 
where no enforcement actions are taken 
against the latter, as well as an investigation 
of the company’s financial standing to 
determine the viability of the company’s 
business. Such moratorium is informal 
rather than formal like the one available 
under formal rescue procedures within the 
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SOA (only Malaysia has a moratorium 
in its Scheme), administration and CVA 
with moratorium (applicable only for the 
UK). However, both informal and formal 
moratorium come within the collective 
rescue regime that holds back individual 
debt enforcement among creditors enabling 
it to prevent the damaging ‘race to collect’ 
among creditors that results in the gradual 
‘take to pieces’ of the corporate assets. 
Ironically, one of the weaknesses of 
the LA and CDRClies with the informal 
moratorium, while another disadvantage 
of both workout frameworks is the need 
for unanimity of support from relevant 
creditors; if a single creditor refuses to 
agree to a proposed negotiation, this could 
result in a failed workout. Moreover a 
requirement for unanimity risks slowing 
down the workout process, and therefore 
they may be practicable when the creditors 
consist of a small group of banks rather 
than when large groups of banks and non-
banks are involved. In the UK, the BOE 
in the past has suggested the possibility 
of majority voting as a solution for the 
need of unanimity, and unless such 
recommendation is implemented, it will 
remain the main disadvantage of a corporate 
workout. Nonetheless, such workout has the 
inherent fragility of being dependent upon 
a high degree of co-operation amongst a 
different range of parties, and it may be no 
exaggeration to say that the failure of such 
co-operation may result in the initiation of 
the liquidation process, which in many cases 
will lead to the downfall or demise of the 
company (Brown, 1996; Bird, 1996).
Under the frameworks of the LA and 
CDRC, if the company or its business is 
viable the banks may consider providing 
financial support for the troubled company 
that includes, amongst others, further 
lending of new money, which may help 
to overcome their financial problem. Yet 
such additional cash flow is normally given 
priority (by agreement) as the price for the 
former consent as well as reflecting the 
additional risk accruing to them, and this 
appears to portray that the banks/secured 
creditors fare better at the expense of other 
creditors as well as shareholders (Buljevich, 
2005; Koh, 2003). 
The differences between the LA and 
CDRC are illustrated in their choice of 
adviser; the LA, being more specific, 
will appoint a team of accountants to 
investigate the company’s finances, whereas 
under the CDRC, such a similar task 
would be conducted by an independent 
financial advisor (consultant), which might 
include an accountant. Moreover, unlike 
the LA, the viability of the business was 
not the only criterion for a company to 
be eligible under the CDRC; the debtors 
should have had borrowings from at least 
two creditors amounting to a minimum 
aggregate borrowing of RM30 million. The 
LA can employ any suitable method for 
restructuring depending on circumstances, 
as it is up to those involved to agree whereas 
the restructuring method under the CDRC as 
reported included debt to equity conversion, 
debts/interest waiver, cash payment, debt 
rescheduling, redeemable instruments, 
convertible redeemable instruments and 
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convertible irredeemable instrument 
(Rajandram, 1999:CBOM, 2007). Similar 
to the role of the BOE under the LA, wherein 
the central bank acts as a peacemaker, the 
CBOM worked closely with the CDRC on 
the basis of the mediation concept in order 
to facilitate and steer negotiations between 
banks and corporate debtors. If the BOE 
plays the leading role of the mediator in 
the corporate workout based on the LA’s 
structure, the same role was played by the 
CBOM through the Steering Committee 
(SC) headed by the Governor of the CBOM 
(Azmi and Abd Razak, 2011). 
It is important to note that there are 
some problems as well as challenges for 
a non-statutory corporate workout under 
the framework of the LA and CDRC, like 
the issue of ‘new money,’ debt trading or 
credit derivative, (even though such issues 
probably arose with less attention within the 
CDRC). The arrangement via LA and CDRC 
is informal, has no binding legal status 
and can be called off by either party at any 
time. Notwithstanding that, the arrangement 
offers flexibility where no changes in power 
are required but the company may get a 
fresh injection of funds while creditors may 
strengthen their positions. Even though, 
CDRC announced its closure in 2002, it was 
restored in July 2009. CDRCwas revived 
as part of pre-emptive measures against 
any large increase in nonperforming loans 
in the Malaysian banking system during 
the current global recession (Azmi and 
Abd Razak, 2011).CDRC remains as an 
informal corporate rescue workout even 
after it wasrevived in 2009.However, CDRC 
is not for every company with financial 
difficulties.The applicant company, as part 
of the requirements, must have a potentially 
viable business and only those company 
that have aggregate indebtedness of RM30 
million or more with at least two financial 
creditors are covered under CDRC (Azmi 
and Abd Razak, 2011).
CONCLUSION
A company can be rehabilitated without 
resort to the formal insolvency system if its 
financial distress is detected earlier and it 
can be resolved quickly through an informal 
rescue that offers many advantages to both 
creditors and debtors. What is important is 
for the company to have a viable business 
and the turnaround professional or ‘company 
doctor’ who can advise on the best alternative 
to take in order to rescue the company 
earlier, thereby increasing the chances of 
success. Informal rescue processes generally 
involve voluntary negotiations between the 
debtor and some or all of its creditors. Often 
these types of negotiations are developed 
through the banking and commercial sectors 
and typically provide for some form of 
restructuring of the companies in distress. 
Informal rescue offers a number of potential 
gains as it is faster and cheaper than formal 
rescue and offers a lot of confidentiality, 
thus protecting the goodwill and standing 
of the company. There is always flexibility 
in the informal rescue negotiation, where 
the terms and conditions of the rescue 
can be changed during negotiation, while 
formal rescue process would not have the 
same degree of flexibility. Despite all the 
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good points that informal rescue offers, 
it also suffers from weaknesses. The first 
weakness is the requirement of unanimity 
(like in the case of workout/arrangement 
with the lenders) where the agreement of 
all parties whose privileges are affected 
will generally be required if the rescue 
is to succeed. The second weakness is 
that there is lack of formal moratorium. 
Therefore, creditors who oppose the process 
have the right to disrupt the informal 
rescues by initiating formal insolvency 
procedures, including liquidation.This risk 
thereforemakes an informal rescue a fragile 
device dependent on the cooperation of all 
parties. Nevertheless, it can be seen that 
there are always material advantages for 
both creditors and debtors in the speedy 
completion of informal rescue. 
The above discussion on informal 
corporate rehabilitation reveals that there 
is a broad range of rescue activities or 
mechanism available to ailing companies 
and creditors to figure out if the company 
or its business is viable and deserves 
to be rescued. It can be seen that ailing 
companies may be “reorganised (where, for 
example, managerial reforms are instituted), 
restructured (where, perhaps, closures of 
elements of the business are involved), 
refinanced (as where new capital is injected 
or debts are rescheduled), downsized (where 
operations may be cut-back, workforces 
reduced or activities rationalised) or 
subjected to sell-offs (where parts of the 
business are sold to other firms or even 
to managers in management buyouts” 
(Finch, 2009; p.244). The discussion on 
types of rescues activities is definitely not 
comprehensive. However, rescue measures 
like sell-offs, MBO, retrenchments and 
debt equity conversion are some ofthe 
common rescue measures that are available 
in bothMalaysia and the United Kingdom.
Such rescue measures could all occur 
outside formal rescue regimes and for some 
troubled companies this could be part of 
a formal proposal within a formal rescue 
procedure. For instance, a MBO can take 
place under receivership or debt for equity 
conversion within a SOA or CVA (only in 
UK). Meanwhile in large-scale informal 
workout or arrangements for companies 
with banks or creditors, unless unanimity 
of support of the affected creditors is 
obtained, the workout would fail. Arguably, 
the participants have the option to organise 
the workout within a formal rescue regime 
like the SOA that can proceed with majority 
voting and without unanimity, but binds 
both dissenters and the apathetic. Formal 
and informal rescue procedures are related, 
partly because formal rescue procedures 
provide the baseline for negotiations among 
stakeholders seeking to achieve an informal 
rescue (Walter and Armour, 2006). In this 
sense, in the UK context it is claimed that 
the Enterprise Act 2002 affects the terms 
on which the various interested parties 
bargain in the shadow of the law and may 
therefore influence their behaviour prior 
to the commencement of a formal rescue 
procedure (Walter and Armour, 2006). 
While in Malaysia, it is pointed out that the 
informal rescue or workout co-exists with 
formal rescue proceedings and for informal 
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workouts to be effective, there must be 
mechanisms in place within the existing 
legal infrastructure to transform the informal 
agreements into legally effective solutions 
(Kit Lee, 2001). Meanwhile,international 
organisations like World Bank recognisethat 
informal workouts are negotiated in the 
‘shadow of the law’ and an environment 
that includes clear laws and procedures 
is necessary to encourage participants to 
restore an enterprise to financial stability 
(Word Bank, 2005).  Formal rescue 
procedures do indeed form the backdrop 
to these workouts/arrangements and if 
informal rescue (turnaround or workouts) 
fails, the company goes into formal rescue 
procedures.
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